Taiwan, China and US ; U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations

These relationships began in 1949 when The tensions between China and Taiwan find their roots Chinese revolution, when communists led by Chairman Mao claimed control of the mainland. Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek withdrew to Taiwan, with two million refugees, vowing the reclaim the mainland. With the influx of so many refugees, resentment grew between the millions of native Taiwanese and the mainland newcomers. The conflict reached such a point that Chiang imposed a "perpetual" martial law over the island for the next 38 years. Thousands of opponents were executed under his rule, and severe restrictions were placed on civil and political liberties.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 U.S. President Harry S. Truman ordered the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent possible Chinese attack on the island. It was the first time the United States had intervened in the conflict between the island and mainland. The U.S. considered Taiwan a buffer against communist expansion in Asia and provided the island money and military supplies. During the 1960s some native Taiwanese, upset by the rule of the mainland minority, began to call for independence from China. It was during this time that focus shifted from reclaiming the mainland to developing the island itself.

But it was also during this period that the U.S. and other countries began improving relations with China as a way to prevent Soviet expansionism. In 1971, the United Nations expelled Taipei's nationalist government in favor of Beijing's. Eight years later, the United States formally recognized the People's Republic of China, severing official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, now under the rule of Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo. The U.S. move meant that America accepted Beijing's "one China" mandate and abandoned its defense pact with the island. Within months, though, the U.S. Congress reinstated unofficial economic ties with Taiwan, including the sale of arms.

The Taiwan Strait is one of the most dangerous military flashpoints in the world, and perhaps the most complex and challenging future foreign and defense policy issue facing the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the gravity of the situation, the powers involved, and the stakes at hand, it is arguably more important than the current situation regarding North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

Early in his tenure as Chief Executive, President Bush clarified the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. On ABC's Good Morning America television show on April 25, 2001, the President stated that if the PRC attacked Taiwan, the U.S. had an obligation to defend the Taiwanese. He declared that the U.S. would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself." In a February 2002 speech to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council meeting in St. Petersburg, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz noted that, "As President Bush and others have said, the United States is committed to doing whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself. Our position is clear. We don't support Taiwan independence, but we oppose the use of force." At this same conference, Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly each met with the Taiwanese Defense Minister, Tang Yao-ming. This was the first visit of a Taiwanese Defense Minister to the United States since the breaking of official relations with Taiwan in 1979. This meeting established a new precedence in the defense relationship, and publicly demonstrated a strong interest in issues related to Taiwan's security. Other high-level defense visits have also taken place.

Taiwan's international political isolation is related to a second challenge--overcoming resistance within Taiwan's defense establishment to make the requisite changes to improve Taiwan's fighting efficiency and effectiveness. Concepts such as joint operations will be critical to ensuring Taiwan's ability to deter and counter PRC coercion and other forms of aggression. Increased contact with modern foreign militaries might improve Taiwan's receptiveness to new military concepts.

While transformation appears to be the buzzword of the moment in U.S. military circles, almost every military organization, including many in the U.S., resists change, even when such change is necessary. Initiative, innovation, and evolution in the Taiwan military are critical to its future viability as a deterrent to provocative or aggressive Chinese actions. Although Taiwan should be applauded for its broad defense reform efforts, the historical dominance of the defense establishment by the ground forces and the uniformed military have made large-scale changes in its defense establishment culture difficult, especially as regards civil-military relations. Taiwan's unwillingness to pursue needed changes will increase the rate at which the PRC's military closes the gap with, and surpasses, the Taiwan armed forces.

Taiwan should place greater emphasis on preparing for PRC coercive uses of force, short of a full-scale amphibious invasion. In coercive scenarios, the PRC would attack Taiwan's strategic center of gravity--meaning Taiwan's political and military leadership--in hopes of a quick victory. PRC coercion or compulsion would seek to undermine national will, morale, and resolve, forcing Taiwan to the negotiating table quickly, on terms favorable to the PRC, and before concerned governments or forces could intervene diplomatically or politically.

Force Modernization and Strategy:

1. US believes that it is imperative for Taiwan to construct a survivable national command and control (C2) system, which is capable of providing sufficient strategic and tactical warning of hostile action.
2. Taiwan's three military services must be interoperable and able to function as a team.
3. Taiwan must be able to protect its critical civil infrastructure from military or cyber attacks and ensure there is a continuity of services to the government, military, and general populace in times of crisis.
4. Taiwan must be capable of defending against a Chinese air and missile campaign. Taipei must understand that an integrated approach to air defense--meaning both active and passive measures--is critical.
5. Taiwan should move in the direction of a defense strategy that contains a limited offensive element. This is a very controversial issue.

Finally, United State has been promoting democratic civil-military relations in Taiwan. Although a long-standing tradition, Taiwan's armed services can no longer operate in isolation from the rest of the Taiwanese government, especially the Ministry of National Defense. Political considerations will define the nature of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, including its scope, intensity, and duration. These political decisions will be made by Taiwan's civilian leaders in consultation with the senior leadership of the armed forces. The uniformed armed forces must work with the civilian leadership in their pursuit of national security objectives.

Taiwan needs a transparent and accountable unformed military that is fully responsive to its democratically elected political leadership. Unity of purpose, maintenance of discipline within the military leadership, and the seamless interplay between the political and military leaders is critical for resisting PRC coercion or aggression. Many PRC strategies would seek to divide the political leadership from the military to create confusion and foster weakness and indecision critical to military success.

There is no doubt that the Taiwan military would obey the direction of its democratically elected leadership. Problems in civil-military relations, thus, are not only questions of civilian control of the military, but civilian participation in the defense policy process. But there is a dearth of qualified civilians who are prepared to assume senior leadership positions within the Ministry of National Defense. Through educational programs and on-the-job training, Taiwan must invest in a cadre of civilians capable of managing national security and defense affairs. The argument often heard in Taiwan that civilian defense specialists are not qualified to comment or work on defense matters is not credible in the U.S., Japan, and other countries, all of which rely heavily on the expertise of civilian defense professionals. Taiwan must provide incentives for young people to enter national service in the national security field.

In addition, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense must be capable of executing combined operations with civil agencies and law enforcement authorities, especially during times of national crisis such as a military contingency or even natural disaster. The Ministry of National Defense must also be responsive to media scrutiny and oversight by the Legislative Yuan, and it must be accountable to its citizenry. These are all hallmarks of an open, democratic society. Strengthening civil-military relations and building public trust will allow Taiwan to undertake the necessary steps required for its defense modernization.

Last, it is essential that Taiwan also develop laws that will establish a common means of protecting classified information, holding people accountable, and meting out appropriate punishment to offenders and spies. Frequent leaks of sensitive defense information, especially by the uniformed services, undermine Taiwan's national security as well as any relationship with current or future defense partners.